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Strategic Vertical Pricing in the U.S. Butter Market 
I.  Introduction 
  Empirically evaluating vertical market structures in a multi-level supply channel 
is especially challenging because of analytical complexities and lack of wholesale prices. 
Consequently, modelers in the past have obtained parameter estimates using simplifying 
assumptions about vertical channel relationships and relying linear or approximated 
demand specifications. Their empirical work also tended to focus on a small number of 
brands (e.g. Sudhir 2001
1) and employ multi-step estimation procedures (e.g. Villas-Boas 
2006). In this paper, we develop a methodology that overcomes some of these 
shortcomings and is motivated primarily along practical lines for empirical research.  
  One of the main applications of channel studies has been modeling the 
competitive interactions between national brands and private labels (i.e. store brands).
2 
Over the past several decades, private label products have made substantial inroads in the 
food industry in terms of increasing market shares, shelf location, and the number of 
product offerings.  The nature of the vertical competitive structure between large food 
retailers that own the private labels and manufacturers that own national brands has been 
a primary concern for policymakers and antitrust agencies.  Thus, understanding the way 
in which the vertical food markets are structured and how costs and/or market power are 
translated to retail prices represents an important research topic for public policy.  
  Various simplifying assumptions have been imposed in past studies trying to 
evaluate the impact of vertical channels on prices.  Some common vertical market 
structural assumptions have included: Manufacture Stackelberg (MS), Vertical Nash 
(VN), and nonstrategic proportional (i.e. mark-up) pricing rules. However, little empirical 
work has been done to examine the suitability of these assumptions before they are used.    
Choi (1991) specifies three pure strategy vertical games (Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), 
                                                 
1 Sudhir points out that: “While it is possible to extend the model development to additional brands, solving 
for the optimal vertical strategic reactions becomes computationally cumbersome”  
2 Unlike competition between two national brands, there are often more vertical complexities between 
retailers and manufacturers in a competition interaction between national brands and store brands.   3
Vertical Nash (VN), and Retailer Stackelberg (RS)), and theoretically shows the 
important effects of demand specifications on the equilibrium results.  To overcome 
tractability and convergence issues in complex vertical aligned market models, it was 
common to presume linear or linearized demand functions. Such restrictions on consumer 
behavior are not supported by demand theory, the restrictions may not hold empirically, 
and thus model results at likely to be fragile.  Indeed, Cotterill and Putsis (2001) 
empirically reject linear demands in favor of more flexible forms (LA-AIDs model), and 
suggested that “future theoretical and empirical research addressing channel issues should 
avoid the linear form wherever possible.”  
           In this paper, we begin by developing a modeling methodology for empirically 
analyzing vertically strategic interactions in a multi-level supply channel. The approach 
in this paper is particularly appealing for several reasons.  It overcomes some of the 
problematic tractability concerns present in past multi-level channel studies while 
allowing for the usage of complex demand functions.  It can be applied to multi- retailer 
cases, and, like several previously developed channel approaches, (e.g. Sudhir 2001), it 
does not require wholesale price information.   
  Our estimation methodology is motivated by a two recent papers (Dhar, Chavas, 
Cotterill and Gould (2005) and Wang, Stiegert and Dhar (2008)), who made complex 
demand functions more accessible to competitive analysis among national brands in 
single-level marketing studies.  This methodology is then extended to analyze beyond the 
the retail market to consider strategic vertical market structures including horizontal 
manufacturing competion.  The model is fitted for retail and production butter market 
data for seven demographic market areas. Over the past few decades, the U.S. butter 
sector has evolved into a market with highly concentrated oligopolies both at the 
processing and retail level.  Furthermore, private labels (i.e. store brands) in the butter 
market have captured a sizable market share (53% in 2005). The prominent position of 
private labels in a market with few branded products and oligopolistic manufacturing 
provide for an interesting case study of pricing strategies in a vertical sector.     4
          The empirical analysis in this paper makes use of IRI scanner data for the markets 
from January 1998 to June 2002. We examine some of the central assumptions 
commonly used in the literature on vertical interactions. Market structure and strategic 
pricing are then investigated under best-fitting assumptions. We estimate a flexible 
nonlinear almost ideal demand system (AIDS) across a menu of alternative pricing 
models using full information likelihood maximization (FIML).  The menu of market 
alternatives include possible structural outcomes at the retail level, the manufacturing 
level and in the vertical channel: (1:retail) individual brand profit maximization, three 
other sub-category profit maximization rules,  (2:vertical channel) MS, VN and single 
market level, (3:manufacturing) Bertrand pricing and tacit collusion two national brands 
and tacit collusion of among all national brands. In total, the best-fitted model was 
selected from 24 estimated models.  
           Our results show that manufactures followed Bretrand pricing, retailers maximized 
national brands as a complete category separate from private labels and that the vertical 
channel was most consistent with VN conduct. Moreover, we rejected the use of retailers’ 
proportional mark-up assumption. These results suggest that models simply assuming 
one-marketing stage or vertical “Manufacturer Stackelberg” game in the channel may not 
accurately reflect market reality. To our knowledge, this is the first structural analysis of 
the U.S. retail butter market that considers both vertical and horizontal strategic 
interactions, and is the first study to use a flexible nonlinear AIDS model in examining 
vertical strategic models.  Our econometric results lend broad support to the findings of 
previous research, and have important implications for both national brand and store 
brand butter marketing managers. 
  The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce 
the new methodology and derive estimable first order conditions under different vertical 
model assumptions. In section 3, we describe the data and present our empirical model, 
followed by the econometric results. Finally, section 4 presents conclusions. 
II. Theoretical Framework       5
           In this section, we explain our approach in deriving the estimable profit 
maximizing first- order conditions for a channel. When modeling a pricing strategy in a 
multi-level supply channel, one needs one to be concerned about the vertical as well as 
the horizontal nature of competitive interactions. Therefore, we first derive optimal 
decision rules for the retailer and the manufacturing stages, and then we model the 
interactions between manufacturers and retailers under different forms of presumed 
vertical conduct. Finally, we derive first order conditions for the entire supply channel.   
            For the simplicity of exposition, we can assume that a vertical sector has one 
retailer and three manufacturers A, B and C as depicted in figure 1.  Manufacturer A 
produces one national brand (brand1); Manufacturer B produces two national brands 
(brand 2 and brand 3); Manufacturer C produces a store-brand (brand 4) under the 
management of the retailer.  
 
   
                           Figure1. Vertical Market Structure 
 
 
II.a The Retailer 
Manufacturer A  Manufacturer B  Manufacturer C 
Retailer 
Brand 1 
Brand 2  Brand 3 
Brand 4 
Consumers   6
            We are interested in modeling different types of the retailer’s pricing rules. In the 
case of category-profit-maximization, the retailer maximizes category profits (π ) by 
choosing retail prices ( i p ) for given wholesale prices ( i W , for national brands 1,2 and 3) 
and constant marginal cost ( 4 c , for store-brand 4).  
            Max  11 1 22 2 33 2 44 4 () ( ) () () p wx p wx p wx p cx π =− +− +− +−                          
            The retailer’s FOC equations can be derived as ( i ∀ =1...4): 








































             These FOCs can be rewritten as follows:        
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where 
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. Note that the equation (1) nests different types of 
retailers’ pricing rules. For instance, in the case of the retailer’s brand-profit 
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. If the retailer imposes a non-strategic proportional   7































































i m >1,  i ∀ .   
 
II.b The Manufacturer 
  The two national-brand manufacturers maximize their profit (π ) by choosing 
values of wholesale prices ( i w ):  
           Max  11 1 1 () wc x π =− , for firm A,                                                                    
           Max  22 2 2 3 3 3 () () wc x wc x π =− +− , for firm B.                                                     
Where  i c  is the constant marginal cost of different brands.  
           Using a conjecture variation approach
3, we can assume that the manufacturers 
form conjecture is such that each brand’s wholesale price is a function of the competing 
brands’ wholesale prices (i.e. 123 21 31 (,) ,() ,() www ww ww).  The corresponding first order 
conditions (FOCs) can be derived as follows: 
       Brand 1:    
3 11 2 1
11 1




ww w w w w
π ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ − + +
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=0                                 
       Brand 2:    
33 22 1 1
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22 1 2 2 1 2
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ff f fw w
xw c w c
ww w w w w w
π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
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∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
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       Brand 3:    
33 22 1 1
32 2 3 3
33 1 3 3 1 3
( ) () ( ) ()
ff f fw w
xw c w c
ww w w w w w
π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
=+ − + + − +
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       Note that they can be alternatively expressed as
4: 
      
11
11 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 1
23
() ( )
ww w w w ww
TW TW TC
ww
εε η ε η +− + + =0                                          (2) 
      
22
22 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 2
11
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3 Conjecture variation models nest many non-cooperative games (Dixit 1986). 
4 First order conditions in terms of elasticity are first used in Dhar, Chavas, Cotterill and Gound (2005).     8
      
33
32 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3
11
() ( ) () ( )
ww w ww w ww
TW TW TC TW TC
ww
εε η εε η +− + +− + =0         (4) 
Where  i TW denotes total wholesale dollar sales,  i TC  is total variable cost. 
w ε is the 
wholesale price elasticity of demand, and 
ij
w η is the brand  j ’s conjecture of brand i’s 
price response,  j i, =1,2,3. This conjecture variation model nests different types of games 
between the manufacturers (Dixit 1986). For instance, in the case of Nash Bertrand game, 
all conjectural variation would equal to zero, and the FOCs would become: 
           11 1 1 1 ) (
w TC TW TW ε − + =0 
           32 3 3 22 2 2 2 ) ( ) (
w w TC TW TC TW TW ε ε − + − + =0 
           33 3 3 23 2 2 3 ) ( ) (
w w TC TW TC TW TW ε ε − + − + =0 
 
II.c Vertical (retailer-manufacture) interaction  
  In absence of wholesale price information, we need a way to combine the FONCs 
of the retailer and manufacturers into one estimable supply side equation. Specifically, 
this means that we have to transform the manufacturer’s FONCs ((2) (3) (4)) to obtain: a) 
a total wholesale margin of the manufacturer as a function of variables with observable 
information, and b) a vertical interface that correctly tracks our presumed vertical 
behavior.  Our procedures follow a) and b) sequentially.   
  When selling products through the retailer, manufacturers face derived demand 
functions: 
           1123 4 2123 4 3123 4 4123 4 ((, ,,) , (, ,,) ,(, ,,) , (, ,,) ) ii x fpwwwc pwwwc pwwwc pwwwc =  
i ∀ =1...4. Where  i f (.) is given by the demand model.  Therefore, we can present 
wholesale price elasticities as follows:  ij j ij
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Accordingly, the FOCs for producers’ profit maximization (2) (3) (4) can be alternatively 
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           Substituting equation (2) into (1) gives the following estimable equations for the 
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                                      (6)                         
           Note that the matrix equation nests MS and VN conducts. These conducts are 
characterized by different values of v, depending on individual manufacturer’s beliefs on 
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          In comparison with approaches in previous channel studies, this method simplifies 
the calculation process of estimable first-order conditions, and allows the usage of 
flexible demand functions that have closed- form analytical elasticity estimates such as in 
the case of the AIDS model.
 5  Also, the equations are shown to be in terms of observable 
data and estimated model parameters.  Like several prior models of the vertical channel 
(e.g, Sudhir 2001) this approach steps around the need to collect wholesale price 
information.  If wholesale prices are someday more accessible, the model itself could be 
easily adapted by using the derived formulae for wholesale prices as additional estimation 
equations. Finally, although this approach is introduced in a one-retailer context, it can 
                                                 
5 In absence of wholesale price data, the traditional approach to obtain the manufacturer’s first order 
condition involves using the chain rule by calculating the derivative of consumption with respect to retail 
price and then using the vertical link [/] ii p w × ∂∂ . As discussed earlier, such calculations can be 
intractable in complex game settings.    10
also be applied to multi-retailer cases by differentiating brands by retail chains and by 
manufacturers
6.    
           Note that, when category profit maximization of the retailer is defined in a single-
retailer model,  Ψ + I  matrix becomes singular due to the Cournot aggregation condition. 
As a result, this case of pricing rule of retailer can not be estimated. However, a multi-
retailer model is not subject to this restriction and can be used for the cases of retailer’s 
category profit maximization.   
Given the complex nature of vertical models, channel studies have explained vertical 
conduct in ways consistent with observed behavior. One common approach uses a time 
sequencing argument (i.e. “leader-follower” or “first mover-second mover”) for  the 
manufacturer’s and retailers pricing behavior under MS and VN assumptions.  Under MS 
conduct, manufacturers announce their price as a first mover, and retailers choose their 
retail price as a follower. And in a VN conduct, manufacturers and retailers are assumed 
to make pricing decisions simultaneously.  There are also some other studies that explain 
VN as a conduct in which manufacturers and retailers ignore each other’s actions.   
          We suggest a different way to interpret behavior in the vertical setting.  In 
particular, we believe the critical difference between MS and VN relies not on the timing 
of pricing decisions but rather the manufacturer’s beliefs (or information) about the 
retailer’s pricing rules.  We explain MS as a vertical conduct that features manufacturers 
having full information about the market and retailer’s pricing rules, and explain VN as a 
conduct with manufacturers believing (or guessing, not necessarily correctly) that 
retailers use arms-length pricing rules.  
           
II.d  Demand and Cost specifications 
  In this section, we specify a nonlinear, Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
model (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). The AIDS model is well-known for being 
consistent with economic consumer theory and being fully flexible in demand estimations.  
Also, the use of the demand specification highlights the generic nature of our 
                                                 
6 See Dhar and Cotterill (2003) for more about differentiating brands by retailer and manufacturer.    11
methodology. Our literature survey shows that this is the first study to use a flexible 
nonlinear AIDS model in estimating vertical strategic models.   
           The AIDS function can be stated as: 










) ln( ) ln( β γ α                                                                      (7) 
           Where p= (p1, … , pN) is a (N × 1) vector of prices for x, M denotes expenditure on 
the N goods, wilt= (pilt xilt/Mlt) is the budget share for the ith brand consumed in the lth 
city at time t. The term P can be interpreted as a price index defined by ln(Plt) =δ+∑Nm= 
1αm ln(pmlt) + 0.5 ∑Nm= 1∑Nj= 1γmj ln(pmlt) ln(pjlt). 
           The demand system imposes symmetry restrictions: 
             ji ij γ γ =  for all  j i ≠                                                                
           and homogeneity restrictions:                                                                                (8) 
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           The parameter δ is often set to some predetermined value (Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980a), For the present analysis, we follow the approach suggested by Mischine, Moro 
and Green and set δ =0. 
           Market-level empirical demand analyses have often ignored expenditure 
endogeneity issues. These issues arise as a result of expenditure variables (Mit) being 
correlated with the residual error terms in the demand specification. Blundell and Robin 
(2000) and Dhar, Chavas and Dhar (2002) found significant effects of the issues on 
parameter estimates in AIDS. Therefore, similar to Blundell and Robin, we use a reduced 
form expenditure equation to control for possible expenditure endogeneity: 
            f Mlt = (Time trend, Income),                                                                              (9) 
where household expenditure in the lth city at time t is a function of median household 
income and a time trend.   12
            Unlike a single-stage marketing research, our channel concerned research needs 
to specify the cost both at the processing and retail levels. At the retail level, we assume 
that marginal cost of selling butter is constant and equal to the wholesale price of butter. 
At the processing level, we plan to use a generalized Leontief cost specification (Diewert, 
1971) to capture input cost variations: 
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CQ a v v Q b v
== =
=+ ∑∑ ∑                                                      
            Where 
k
rh C is the cost of processor k for brand r sold in city h;  
                         rh Q  is the level of output for brand r sold in city h; 
                         i v , j v  are the prices of input i and j for brand r; 
                         i, j = 1….n. 
           This generalized Leontief cost function has performed well in recent empirical IO 
literature (e.g. Azzam, 1997; Dhar and Cotterill, 2003) for its mathematical simplicity 
and flexibility in a complex non-linear system.  
 
III. Empirical Estimation 
III.a Discussion of the Data  
          Our empirical analysis is based on Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) data on butter 
products across seven local geographic markets
7  in the U.S. Midwest region from 
January 1998 to June 2002. These markets were selected based on an explorative 
multivariate analysis (Du, 2008) and data availability. The IRI data provide retail-price 
related information for 153 main national brands produced by 110 manufacturers. 
Aggregate information about entire retail butter market and one aggregate all–other 
national brand is also given. Using the database, we created top branded, aggregate all-
other branded and aggregate private label variables across all markets. On the demand 
side, to incorporate the effect of income differences on butter purchase, we used median 
                                                 
7  These cities include Des Moines, Kansas city, Milwaukee, Denver, Indianapolis, Minneapolis and 
Oklahoma.   13
household income in each city collected from Current Population Survey- Annual 
Demographic Survey (March CPS Supplement).  
          These data were merged with independent supply-side data collected from diverse 
resources
8. Assuming that production of butter requires three major inputs: cream, labor 
and energy
9, the farm-level cream price data were obtained from FMMO (Federal Milk 
Marketing Order) Price Series; the effect of labor is captured by the wage rate of 
production workers for the dairy manufacturing industries in the U.S. (“Average hourly 
earnings of production workers-manufacturing-dairy products” from the U.S. Department 
of Labor.  Series ID: EEU32203006(n)-Dairy products (SIC code 202)); and electricity 
rate (collected from Energy information Administration (EIA)’s Short-Term Energy 
Outlook Query System) is used to capture the effect of energy cost on processing butter.  
          The IRI data on retail level butter has one limitation. While it offers a detailed 
vendor and manufacturer information, it does not give the names of retailers. As a result, 
we need to specify vertical games under the assumption that there is one single common 
retailer managing all the brands made by multiple processors in each city.  
          Here we give a brief description of the markets. Like the entire U.S. butter sector, 
private label butter in these marketing areas has reached a very high average market share 
(53%). There are two top national brands (named as brand A and brand B in this paper) in 
this market. National brand A has a market share of 26%, and national brand B has a 
market share of 14%. All other national brands have a small share of 6%. In terms of 
prices, Brand A is most expensive with an average price of $3.25/ lb. Other brands have a 
similar average price level. (Brand B is $2.27; All other small national brand is $2.45; 
Aggregate store brand is $2.29) 
 
III.b Empirical Specification 
         On the demand side, a set of city dummy variables are applied to control for city 
specific fixed effects for each brand. In addition, a time trend variable is used to each of 
                                                 
8 The IRI data are reported every 4 weeks. All other data are transformed into the same pattern to match the 
data.  
9 See Butter processing cost issued by California department of food and agriculture.   14
the share equations of demand model (7) to incorporate the general consumption trends 
of this market. To maintain theoretical consistency of the AIDS model, the following 
restrictions based on (8) are applied to these parameters:  












ir d ,  r =1…7, i =1…4                                                  (10) 
Where: 
          r D  = the city dummy variable for the  r th city.  
          ir d  = the parameter for the i th brand associated with r D .  
         The reduced form expenditure function in (9) is specified as:  
          ∑
=






l rt rt t rt S INC INC Trend M φ φ δ                                                      (11) 
Where  t Trend  is a linear trend, capturing time specific unobservable effect on consumer 
butter expenditure;  l S  is a group of season dummies, capturing the seasonality of butter 
purchases; rt INC  is the median household income in city r, and is used to capture the 
effect of income differences on butter purchases.  
         On the supply side, as mentioned earlier, at the retail level, the marginal cost of 
selling butter is assumed to be constant and equal to the wholesale price of butter. At the 
processor level, we use a generalized Leontief cost function (Diewert, 1971) to capture 
input cost variations. Production of butter is assumed to require three major inputs: cream, 
labor and energy with substitution possibilities between labor and energy only. We 
assume all the cost parameters are constrained to be manufacturer specific. All parameter 
values of the cost specification are the same and do not change when the brands are made 
by the same manufacturer and when they are sold in different marketing area. So the cost 
function is:  
          ) ( ) ( 3 3 2 2 1 1
2 5 . 0
3
5 . 0
2 23 3 33 2 22 1 11 v b v b v b Q v v a v a v a v a Q C ir
m m m m
ir
m
ir + + + + + + =                (12) 
Where: 
           
m
ir C is the cost of manufacturer m for brand i sold in city r.  
            ir Q  is the level of output for brand i sold in city r.     15
            1 v , 2 v , 3 v  are input prices for cream, labor and energy respectively.     
           We examine some of the central assumptions commonly used in the literature on 
vertical linkages. Market structure and strategic pricing are then investigated under best 
fit assumptions. Sudhir (2001) emphasizes the need to model and infer vertical 
interactions simultaneously to accurately estimate the manufacturer’s competition when 
using data at the retail level. So we estimated a series of demand and pricing models 
(under a variety of assumptions) via full information likelihood maximization (FIML).  
The assumptions considered are:  
             (1) MS VN, VI (or single marketing level, or non-linear vertical interactions),  
             (2) Bertrand game and alternative tacit collusion of manufacturer pricing 
(between the top two national brands, and among all national brands)
 10.   
             (3) A variety of strategic pricing rules and proportional mark up behavior of 
retailers
11.  
            Our approach produces eight equations to be estimated for each model: three 
demand equations (10), four price reaction equations (6) and one expenditure function 
(11). Due to the adding- up constraints of the AIDs functions, one share equation on the 
demand side was dropped. The models are estimated by specifying the FIML 
concentrated log likelihood function of the system with eight endogenous variables: three 
quantity demanded variables, four price variables and the expenditure variable.    
 
III.c Empirical Results 
         We conducted a series of nested and non-nested tests to determine assumptions that 
fit the data best.  Table 1 reports log-likelihoods and Akaike information criterion test 
statistics for the different models. Examining the log-likelihoods, we find that the best-
fitted model is one in which (1) the retailer maximizes category profits for national 
                                                 
10 The case of collusion among national brands will only be estimated using the vertical conduct identified 
as the best-fitted model.  
11 Assuming one retailer for each city (see data section in chapter 3), we can not investigate the pricing rule 
of category profit maximization on the retailer’s part (see model limitation in chapter 2). Note that multi-
retailer cases are not subject to this limitation.    16
brands separate from its private label product, (2) the vertical structure is best described 
as vertical Nash (VN), and (3) manufacturer price under Bertrand competition.   
         Our finding about the vertical structure suggests that simply assuming one-
marketing stage or MS in the channel may be inappropriate.  The finding is based on the 
application of our new modeling methodology and the employment of nonlinear AIDs 
models.  It is consistent with the result of Cotterill and Dhar (2000) for butter category. In 
Cotterill and Dhar, two aggregated brands (NB and PL) are investigated by using only 
linear demand functions.  
      Similarly disconcerting results are found for empirical studies that employ 
proportional mark-up assumptions. Using our best fitted model, the test for proportional 
mark-ups behavior of retailer on national brands does not support the use of this 
assumption by retailers (with Wald statistics = 377.37 and P value <0.001). Our results 
suggesting that retailers do not appear to employ proportional mark-ups are also 
consistent with the findings of Cotterill and Dhar (2000) for butter category.  
         In addition, the results do not show significant evidence of tacitly collusive 
manufacturer pricing in this market. Bertrand games fit the data generally better than the 
two collusive cases we investigated. 
 
         Parameter Estimates  
         The econometric results for the best-fitted model can be found in Table 2.  In total, 
77 of 88 estimated coefficients are statistically significant. On the demand side, 55 out of 
60 estimated parameters of the nonlinear Aids model are statistically significant. All 
estimated parameters of expenditure function are significant and have expected signs; the 
estimated coefficients associated with seasonal variables captured the seasonality of 
butter expenditure very well (see Figure 2); the positive estimated income parameters 
suggest that higher income leads to more butter purchase. On the supply side, cost 
estimates generally have anticipated signs. Among them, 23 out of 28 parameters are 
significantly different from zero. And most estimates associated with input factors have 
the anticipated signs.    17
        In our best-fitted model, all the estimated price elasticities have the anticipated signs 
(see Table 3). Own-price elasticities for butter brands are elastic with an average of 4.5.  
In national brands, small national brands competing in the market face consumers who 
are particularly price sensitive. Own price elasticity for the aggregated small brand (-7.47) 
is almost twice as much as those for top brands (-3.77 for brand A and -3.38 for brand B). 
This is consistent with the stronger market positions for the two top national brands. 
Further, price response is asymmetric among national brands.  Brand A has generally less 
cross-price elasticity with respect to other national brands’ prices than vice versa, which 
reflects its dominative role in the industry.  NB B has the least cross effects with other 
brands. This is consistent with the fact that it is the brand with the lowest average price. 
When consumers know that this brand is very cheap compared to alternatives they are 
relatively unresponsive to price changes.  
         The aggregated store brand has a closely similar level of own-price elasticity with 
top national brands. This reflects a strong position of private labels in butter market.         
This result is different from the findings of Cotterill and Dhar (2000), who reported a 
higher own-price elasticity of store brand than national brands for butter category, but 
only analyzed national brands as one aggregate brand. In terms of cross-price elasticity, 
store-brand price cuts are generally more effective in stealing share from national brands. 
For example, a 1% decrease in the price of store brands results in 1.9% of increase in 
national brand a demand, while a 1% price change of national brand a generates a 1.6% 
change in store brand demand. These results are not surprising when we consider the 
large market share that store brands have reached in butter industry. 
         Our estimated expenditure elasticities are all positive and vary between 0.39 and  
2.65, with store brands being the most inelastic and small national brand being the most 
elastic brand (see Table 4). This implies that when customers decide to spend more 
money on butter, they often shift their preference toward national brands, especially to 
those with lower prices. It also helps explain one circumstance we observed earlier — 
during holiday sales, store brands often have bigger volume sales but a smaller market 
share.    18
          Profit Margins and Market Power          
          Using our best-fitted model, estimated profit margins for the brands are reported in 
Table 5. National brand B has the lowest channel price-cost margin and small national 
brands have the highest. At the processing level, small national brands have a cost 
advantage over top national brands. And hence, small national brand manufacturers have 
the highest margins. At the retail level, store brands are most profitable with an estimated 
channel profit margin equals to 0.48. Retailer’s profit margins for national brands are 
lower than store brands with an average of 0.34. This is consistent with the rapid growth 
of store brands in this market.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
        In this research, we developed a new methodology for empirically analyzing 
vertically strategic interactions in a multi-level supply channel. Our literature survey 
shows that this is the first study that allows usage of a flexible nonlinear AIDS model in 
examining vertical strategic models. 
         The methodology is applied to examine modeling assumptions and analyze strategic 
pricing for supermarket sales of butter category across seven geographic markets. By 
employing nonlinear AIDs demand model and full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) estimation approach, we find that vertical strategic interactions for the markets 
seem to be consistent with “Vertical Nash” game. And, we reject the use of retailers’ 
proportional mark-up assumption. These results suggest that models simply assuming 
one-marketing stage or vertical “Manufacturer Stackelberg” game in the channel may not 
accurately reflect market reality. These results are consistent with the finding of Cotterill 
and Dhar (2000) for butter category. In Cotterill and Dhar, two aggregated brands 
(National brand and Private labels) are investigated by using only linear demand 
functions.           
        This is the first structural analysis of the U.S. retail butter market, considering both 
vertical and horizontal strategic interactions. Based on the discussion above, our 
econometric results lend broad support to the findings of previous research, and have   19
enormous implications for both national brand and store brand butter marketing managers. 
For example: 
 
•  Price cutting is an effective weapon for store brands to reduce national 
brand sales. Many prior studies on competition between national brand and 
store brands showed that price cutting is generally not an effective tool for 
store brands. However, according to our study, this is not the case here. 
Store-brand price cuts are more effective in stealing share from national 
brands. This finding is consistent with the results of Cotterill, Putsis and 
Dhar (2000) for butter category, who also find the exception of butter 
category among six food products
12.       
•  The leading national brand and small national brands are most likely to be 
affected by private-label discounting.  
•  The effect of national brand price cuts on store brand sales is less 
pronounced, but still effective. This implies that both national brand and 
store brand managers can use discounting to attract the other brands’ 
customers.  
•  The effect of national brand price cuts on store brand sales are not 
distributed evenly among national brands. Price cuts by the leading national 
brands have the biggest effect on private labels.  
•  When customers decide to spend more money on butter, they are likely to 
shift their preference toward national brands, especially to those with lower 
prices. Thus, during holiday sale at each year end, a national brand strategy 
of increasing sales by price promotions is likely to be effective.  
•  Managing store brands are more profitable than national brands for butter 
retailers.  At the retail level, store brands are most profitable with an 
estimated channel profit margin equals to 0.48. Retailer’s profit margins for 
                                                 
12 The six food categories are milk, butter, bread, pasta, margarine and instant coffee.   20
national brands are lower than store brands with an average of 0.34. This is 
consistent with the rapid growth of store brands in this market.  
           One of the shortcomings of this paper is that, due to data limitation, we assumed a 
single-retailer market structure. When the data permits it, this methodological framework 
will allow for assessments of vertical markets for multiple retailers.  
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Table 1: Model log likelihoods and AIC test statistics. 
NB: National brand; 
SB:  Store brand; 
MS: Vertical Manufacturer Stackelberg; 
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Best-Fitting Model. 
    
Variable  Name   Estimates  t  value 
Demand Side       
Brand A Demand        
Ln(Brand a price)    -0.970   -24.78***
Ln(Brand b price)    0.119   4.8***
Ln(Brand AO price)    0.320   5.24***
Ln(Store Brand Price)    0.532   7.26***
City 1    0.597   2.92***
City 2    0.615   3.06***
City 3    0.526   2.52**
City 4    0.504   2.47**
City 5    0.352   1.88*
City 6    0.254   1.23
City 7    0.246   1.31
Time Trend    0.001   4.05***
Ln(Expenditure/Price Index)    -0.027   -1.6
       
Brand B demand        
Ln(Brand b price)    -0.300   -15.24***
Ln(Brand AO price)    -0.174   -6.72***
Ln(Store Brand Price)    0.354   11.55***
City 1    -0.975   -10.66***
City 2    -0.941   -10.25***
City 3    -0.916   -9.38***
City 4    -0.968   -9.93***
City 5    -0.821   -9.26***
City 6    -0.521   -5.23***
City 7    -0.598   -6.53***
Time Trend    -0.001   -5.59***
Ln(Expenditure/Price Index)    0.084   11.29***
         23
Brand AO demand        
Ln(Brand AO price)    -1.414   -12.71***
Ln(Store Brand Price)    1.268   14.03***
City 1    -2.360   -12.93***
City 2    -2.592   -14.33***
City 3    -2.797   -14.69***
City 4    -2.570   -13.81***
City 5    -2.420   -13.44***
City 6    -2.819   -13.99***
City 7    -2.189   -11.17***
Time Trend    -0.001   -1.6
Ln(Expenditure/Price Index)    0.212   14.59***
       
Store Brand Demand       
Ln(Store Brand Price)    -2.154   -19.18***
City1   3.738   26.52***
City2   3.918   26.73***
City3   4.186   25.65***
City4   4.034   24.75***
City5   3.889   23.05***
City6   4.087   21.31***
City7   3.541   18.6***
       
Expenditure Function       
Time Trend    0.002   8.15***
Income   3E-4   5.09***
Income^2   -2.40E-09   -4.1***
Seasona1 1    -8.380   -5.63***
Seasona1 2    -8.411   -5.65***
Seasona1 3    -8.375   -5.62***
Seasona1 4    -8.346   -5.6***
Seasona1 5    -8.441   -5.66***
Seasona1 6    -8.476   -5.69***  24
Seasona1 7    -8.438   -5.7***
Seasona1 8    -8.428   -5.69***
Seasona1 9    -8.382   -5.65***
Seasona1 10    -8.358   -5.63***
Seasona1 11    -8.304   -5.59***
Seasona1 12    -8.229   -5.49***
Seasona1 13    -8.073   -5.41***
       
Supply Side       
Brand A Cost       
Cream Price    1.752   7.98***
Wage Rate     57.435   5.97***
Elasticity Rate    52.375   5.69***
Wage Rate*Elasticity Rate    -110.057   -5.84***
Market Share*Cream Price    -4.79E-06   -7.3***
Market Share*Wage Rate    -7.46E-06   -3.36***
Market Share*Elasticity Rate    1.10E-05   5.07***
       
Brand B Cost       
Cream Price    0.491   4.43***
Wage Rate     7.807   2.54**
Elasticity Rate    4.559   1.55
Wage Rate*Elasticity Rate    -11.303   -1.88**
Market Share*Cream Price    -1.18E-06   -3.55***
Market Share*Wage Rate    -3.21E-06   -4.04***
Market Share*Elasticity Rate    4.34E-06   4.52***
       
Brand AO Cost       
Cream Price    1.334   7.93***
Wage Rate     0.358   0.73
Elasticity Rate    -0.341   -0.76
Wage Rate*Elasticity Rate    -0.792   -0.52
Market Share*Cream Price    -7.40E-06   -2.24**  25
Market Share*Wage Rate    -1.90E-06   -0.53
Market Share*Elasticity Rate    5.04E-06   1.53
       
Store Brand Cost       
Cream Price    -1.771   -16.48***
Wage Rate     26.680   3.62***
Elasticity Rate    16.474   2.24**
Wage Rate*Elasticity Rate    -39.992   -2.72***
Market Share*Cream Price    3.38E-06   11.52***
Market Share*Wage Rate    -1.00E-05   -11.74***
Market Share*Elasticity Rate    6.42E-06   6.87***
Note that:  
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level   
*** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3: Elasticity Matrix. 
  Brand A  Brand B  AO  PL 
Brand  A  -3.768  0.265 0.718 1.862 
 (0.102)  (0.035)  (0.07)  (0.105) 
Brand B  0.675  -3.388  0.637  0.128 
  (0.109)  (0.101) (0.092) (0.106) 
AO 1.325  0.376  -7.467 3.115 
 (0.146)  0.058  (0.477)  (0.379) 
PL  1.643  0.164 1.204 -3.397 
  (0.091)  (0.024) (0.117) (0.119) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 
Table 4: Expenditure Elasticity. 
Brand A  0.923 












Retailer Share of 
Channel Profit 
Manufacturer Share 
of Channel Profit 
Brand A  0.559  0.318  0.353  57%  43% 
Brand B  0.383  0.372  0.016  97%  3% 
AO 0.681  0.345  0.513  51%  49% 
PL 0.475         
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